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In this paper I will identify the shared ancestry of two opposing paradigms in contemporary cognitive 
science, and argue that we can draw on this ancestry to help reconcile the two paradigms. The two 
paradigms are the computational and enactive approaches to cognitive science, and their shared 
ancestry is the cybernetics research program of the 1940s and 50s. I will first present the two paradigms 
and describe their contemporary opposition to one another, before exploring the cybernetic foundation 
that they both share. This, I will argue, contains much of the intellectual resources required in 
order to enable a fruitful reconciliation between the two paradigms. I will not attempt to fully articulate 
that reconciliation here, but I will conclude by suggesting a few promising avenues for future research. 
The computationalist paradigm that is currently dominant in the cognitive sciences, and especially in 
cognitive neuroscience, takes as its foundational assumption the idea that the primary function of the 
brain and nervous system is to perform computations (Piccinini 2012). Explanations of cognitive 
phenomena are given in terms of the performance of computations, and whilst there is some 
disagreement about the form that these computations take, it is agreed that the positing of 
computational mechanisms is a central feature of cognitive scientific explanation. Paradigmatic 
examples of this approach include Marr’s theory of vision (1982), Fodor’s language of thought 
hypothesis (1975), and more recently, connectionist and Bayesian interpretations of cognitive 
computation. 
 
Since Varela, Thompson, & Rosch (1991), the minority opposition to the computationalist paradigm has 
typically been referred to as “enactivism”. The term really covers a family of distinct but related views 
(Villabos & Ward 2015), and here I extend its usage to include dynamicist and embodied approaches 
more generally. What these approaches all have in common is that they reject the primacy of 
computational explanation in favour of explanations that emphasise the role played by non-
computational factors such as the environment (both physical and social) and the body. Some of these 
approaches also deny that the brain or nervous system computes at all, although, as I will try to show, 
this is not essential to the definition of enactivism (just as a denial of bodily or environmental 
contributions to cognition is not essential to the definition of computationalism). 
 
Both the computational and enactivist approaches to cognitive science owe their existence to the 
cybernetics research program of the 1940s and 50s. This grew out of interdisciplinary connections made 
during the war, and solidified in and around the Macy Conferences from 1946-53 (Dupuy 2009: 71- 5). 
At the heart of the program was the computational modelling of the brain pioneered by McCulloch & 
Pitts (1943) and popularised by Von Neumann (1958), but it also included insights such as the 
application of control systems analysis to living organisms (Wiener 1948), circularity and feedback as a 
source of natural teleology (Rosenblueth, Wiener, & Bigelow 1943), and the idea of biological 
homeostasis embodied in Walter’s various robotic creations (1950, 1951). This era was the dawn of 
cognitive science as we know it today, and one of its most interesting features is the fruitful 
collaboration between what would go on to become the core principles of computationalism and 
enactivism: internal computational structure on the one hand and embodied interaction with the 
environment on the other. 
 
This collaboration was possible because computation was not yet conceived of as a primarily 
representational phenomenon. Following Turing (1936), there was a lively interest in the abstract 
philosophical and mathematical understanding of computation, but for many working in cybernetics 
computation’ was still primarily an engineering notion, and a computer was a very real and very physical 
entity. This allowed for experiments such as those conducted by Walter, which were more concerned 
with the interaction between a simple computational system and its environment than with the 
cognitive capacities of computation in the abstract (Walter 1953; Pickering 2010: 37-90). It was not until 
the philosophical work of Putnam and Fodor in the 60s, 70s, and 80s that computationalism came to be 
primarily concerned with an abstract and representational computational theory of mind (see e.g. 
1967a, 1967b; Fodor 1975, 1981). Perhaps not coincidentally, it was also at this point that cybernetics as 
a distinct research program began to collapse, due in no small part to the pressures of carrying out 
interdisciplinary research in an increasingly compartmentalised academic environment (Pickering 2010). 
 
There need not be any fundamental dichotomy between the enactivist and computationalist programs 
in cognitive science. Recent work in philosophy of computation has led to the emergence of distinct 
theories of physical computation, and in particular Piccinini’s mechanistic account provides a promising 
non-representational foundation for reconciliation with the enactivist program (Piccinini 2007, 2015). 
There are some remaining issues that will need to be resolved before such this reconciliation can take 
place, such as whether mechanistic explanation can be understood without any notion of teleology 
(Dewhurst forthcoming; Piccinini 2015: 100-17), and how the enactive notion of functional closure can 
best be applied to computational systems (Dewhurst 2016) but there is no in principle reason why this 
should not be possible. More positively, a reconciled approach to cognitive science would have a lot to 
offer to precisely those issues that cybernetics originally focused on such as the interaction between 
perception and action and the emergence of natural teleology from environmental and social feedback. 
These are issues that remain central to contemporary cognitive science, as demonstrated by the recent 
emergence of the action oriented predictive coding framework (Clark 2016) and developments in social 
cognition that emphasise the role of participatory sense-making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007). Here 
there are important lessons to be learnt from our forgotten cybernetic past, which not only provides a 
demonstration that computation and environmental interaction need not be in opposition, but also 
contains intellectual and explanatory tools that can be reclaimed and put to good use. Without 
returning to this history and considering how we got to where are today, we may never truly be able to 
move forwards. 
 
